Things You Might Not Know About Elections

Introduction

We are pleased to provide this Explainer about elections. It comes in nine parts but is short enough to read in its entirety within 2.5 hours.

Part 1 discusses how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity.
Part 2 explores some of the many forms elections can take. You might be surprised.
Part 3 discusses how elections are administered in the United States.
Part 4 considers the idea of universal voting rights.
Parts 5 – 7 discusses issues related to election integrity, starting with secret ballots.
Parts 8 & 9 considers how to protect our electoral system from various threats.

Some of the basic ideas we hope you will take away from the Explainer are (1) elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity; (2) elections can take many forms; (3) choices made by our state legislatures and local elections administrators can create trust or distrust; and (4) our country has found some very effective ways to prevent manipulation.

Here is the full list of topics. You can use the menu below to go directly to whichever topics interest you the most.

Let’s get started!

Elections Are Essential

Americans have many opportunities to hold their elected officials accountable through a regular time frame for elections. You can see a schedule of elections from our partner Ballotpedia here: https://ballotpedia.org/Sample_Ballot_Lookup.

You already know the value of free and fair elections better than most if you have ever lived in:

  • an anarchy (as in Somalia, 1991-2012, or
  • an autocracy like any of the following examples:
    • a region controlled by a drug cartel (Medellin Cartel in Columbia, 1976-93)
    • a country controlled by a military junta (Myanmar, 1962 onward, Argentina 1976-83)
    • a dictatorship (Saddam Hussein in Iraq, 1979-2006)
    • countries with governments that allow only one political party (the People’s Republic of China), one religion (Saudi Arabia), one “race” (Germany 1935-45), or one economic system (Cuba)
    • countries with governments that regularly punish their political opponents, like Russia and Syria.

Unlike authoritarian regimes, regular, free, and fair elections allow voters to make collective choices about their representatives and the policies they want to support.

Unlike countries that limit basic freedoms, competitive free and fair elections create an environment that allows the possibility of changing leadership without violence – no warfare between cartels, no coups against juntas, and no assassinations of competing factions or dictators.

Competitive, free, and fair elections offer our representatives and leaders an incentive to perform well – on our behalf – not theirs – because they are accountable to each of us, the voters.

Put another way, free and fair elections offer a way to maintain the ultimate power of the voters and move control away from the powerful few. This feature makes all the difference between whose freedom and welfare is prioritized.

Political competition becomes focused on who can earn enough votes to win the right to represent and legislate – instead of bribery, coups, assassinations, repression, and violence. Free and fair elections make it possible to hold legislators and leaders accountable to the voters. Under the best circumstances, elections can encourage healthy competition for the best problem-solving policies.

This “best policies” competition suggests a link between elections and national prosperity. The evidence backs this up. (For example, see our short course “Democracy is Precious.”) Well-functioning republics with competitive elections and basic freedoms have many advantages. They are less corrupt, more inclusive, better problem-solvers, more stable and less violent, less likely to go to war with other democracies and offer more opportunities for success. The cumulative effect is that they have a higher standard of living and are happier.

Today’s key takeaway is that elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity. Tomorrow, we will show how elections can take many forms depending on circumstances and needs.

Elections Can Take Many Forms

Mechanical voting machine.

In Part 1, we reviewed how free and fair elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity. In Part 2, we cover how elections can take many forms depending on circumstances and needs. Variations around the world include who may run for office, who may vote, the mechanics of voting, and how winners are defined.

What basic principles should apply to every election?

Not all elections are the same. Even so, some principles should apply to every election. These include:

  • a regular schedule of elections
  • freedom to vote, campaign, and run for office without fear or violence
  • freedom of speech
  • freedom of assembly
  • freedom to report on competitors’ proposals and performance
  • fair media
  • access to independent reporting
  • transparent campaign financing
  • accurate vote counting and reporting
  • election officials are required to treat all sides fairly
  • an effective electoral justice system to resolve disputes

We now review several different angles of elections. These include who may run for office, who may vote, the mechanics of voting, and how winners are defined.

Who may run for office?

Candidates for office usually run under a political party banner, but not always and everywhere.

  • Some countries allow candidates from more than one party on paper, but the reality is that only one party is allowed full access to power. Examples include the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam.
  • A few countries and states or provinces within countries do not allow political parties. 
  • A few other countries and municipalities allow parties but rely on non-partisan elections, particularly at the local level.
  • Nebraska is the only state that has non-partisan elections for its legislature. Even so, the Democratic and Republican parties in Nebraska frequently endorse candidates for the legislature, and candidates often indicate their political affiliation during their campaign, even though it’s not officially listed on the ballot. This outcome is also seen in many non-partisan municipalities and school board contests throughout the United States.

Who may vote?

Some systems, like ours, place a high value on placing power in the people and holding power accountable to the people – and therefore highlight the universal right to vote (More in Part 4). Other systems limit voting to just a small circle or eligible sub-population. For example, many labor unions allow only their members to vote for their union leaders even though their policies and actions may affect all employees. Some elections are limited to certain subsets of voters who have specific qualifications. In the Vatican, for example, only cardinals under the age of 80 may vote to choose the next Pope, who serves as the de facto monarch of Vatican City. In another example, only Native Americans can vote in tribal elections, which elect leaders who govern and set policies on tribal nation territories. (Some indigenous tribes, such as the Iroquois, were self-governing democracies before the American Revolution.) Similarly, New Zealand allows native Māori peoples the right to vote in their own separate parliamentary district to ensure that they can elect native representatives. Other systems offer additional, compensatory electoral power to historically disenfranchised populations. For example, India reserves a fixed number of parliamentary seats for those at the bottom of the formerly enforced caste system.

What are the mechanics of voting?

Elections can take many forms depending upon circumstances and needs. For example, in The Gambia, as recently as 2021, where illiteracy was a huge societal problem, voters placed marbles in large, differently colored cans labeled with pictures of their candidate. As political parties grew in the United States, partisans began handing out pre-printed ballots known as “straight tickets.” You could depart from the party line only by crossing out a name and writing in someone else’s name. This method is still used in Sweden and other countries. The idea to create ballots requiring voters to make a mark within the square opposite the name of their preferred candidate(s) did not occur until 1858 in South Australia. Grover Cleveland was elected president in 1892 using the new Australian ballots. Mechanical voting machines were first used in Lockport, NY, in 1892. By 1930, they were the standard in every major US city. Voting devices using punched cards were pioneered in 1964. The first electronic voting machine, the Video Voter, was used in Illinois elections in 1975. Electronic voting devices have greatly enhanced the ability of voters with a disability to vote privately and independently. In recent years, the U.S. has moved towards hand-marked paper ballots that are optically scanned for counting. A history of U.S. voting mechanisms can be found here: https://votingmachines.procon.org/history-of-voting-machines/

How are winners defined?

Republics and other democracies choose from a wide range of options for how votes translate into who sits in legislative bodies and who controls the executive branch. Elections can be very different from country to country, state to state, or even from city to city! Each choice comes with its own set of pros and cons. We review only a few here:

  • Largest vote share: In almost all U.S. states, voters elect individual legislators who earn the largest share of votes (a plurality) from single-member districts. That means a two-person race could be won by as little as 50% plus one vote, while a candidate could win a three-person race with as little as one-third of the votes plus one.
    • Some advantages of this system are that it is easy to understand, representatives have a clearly defined geographic constituency, and citizens know exactly who to go to for constituent services and who to hold accountable for outcomes. Plurality systems usually produce strong single-party governments because they tend to produce many seats for the majority party. This feature, in turn, produces a stable political system because there is no need to form coalition governments.
    • Other problems are a feeling of illegitimacy and “wasted votes” for those who did not support the winner. (Wasted votes is a term for votes that do not result in any representation. There are two different types of wasted votes. Excess votes are votes a candidate receives above and beyond what is needed to win. Lost votes are votes that were not enough to make an impact by winning a seat.)
    • Opposition minorities, whether racialized, religious, regional, or ideological, can be at a disadvantage since the winners tend to be more responsive to those who voted for them.
    • The problem is worsened when district boundaries are manipulated (gerrymandered) in ways that give the majority a larger share of legislative seats than its vote share (a large seat-to-vote ratio).
    • Another downside of the plurality system is that it tends to focus voters on only two parties or two candidates – even though it doesn’t legally require only two choices. This is due to “the spoiler effect.” For example, suppose two opposing candidates have most of the votes and are running “neck and neck.” Suppose also there is a third candidate who is like-minded with the first. If that third candidate pulls just a few voters away from the first candidate, then the second candidate will win – the third candidate spoiled the first candidate’s chance to win. Many voters don’t want to take that risk and ignore the third candidate or party. Similarly, some third candidates who fear becoming spoilers may choose not to run. (See also “Vote Splitting” and “Duverger’s Law.”)
    • This logic doesn’t always hold – there have been several presidential elections where third-party candidates ran and earned substantial vote shares. Examples include Teddy Roosevelt in 1912, Robert LaFollette in 1924, and George Wallace in 1968. The case of Ralph Nader in 2000 is especially noteworthy. He managed to siphon off just enough votes from Al Gore in Florida to tip the election to George W. Bush. This was possible only because (1) the Florida race was unusually tight, with Bush winning by only 575 votes; (2) because Florida had 25 electoral votes in the Electoral College, the fourth largest number; and (3) because the final Electoral College vote was very close as well with 271 votes for Bush, 266 for Gore and one of three electoral votes from the District of Columbia abstaining. Shifting 25 electoral votes would have swung the election to Gore. Many more examples of spoilers can be found in congressional races, governor’s races, and legislative elections.
  • Majority vote share: One way to reduce wasted votes is to require the winner to earn a majority of votes rather than a plurality. A run-off election is held if no one earns a majority in the first election. Most but not all countries with presidential systems, and the U.S. states of Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have such requirements. Many people feel majority outcomes are more legitimate than pluralities, and run-offs can motivate parties away from extreme positions. The system can be more time-consuming for all involved when run-offs are required, it does not address the problem of gerrymandering, and there are open debates about how run-off systems impact turnout and the number of political parties.
  • Broadest support: Another option is to select the one candidate with the broadest support. If so, then a system of ranked-choice voting (RCV) can be used. Suppose, for example, that neither of the candidates from the two major parties can win on their own, but a third candidate is an acceptable second choice for almost everyone. In other words, even if your first choice cannot win, you might be comfortable seeing your second-choice win over your last choice! With ranked-choice voting, that second-choice candidate would be the winner.

    All first choices are tallied under RCV. If a candidate receives more than half of the first choices, then that candidate wins, just like in any other majoritarian election. If there is no majority winner after counting the first choices, then the race is decided by an “instant run-off.” The candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and voters who picked that candidate as their top choice will have their next choice counted. This process continues until one of the remaining candidates wins with more than half of the vote.
    • One of the advantages of RCV, in addition to finding the candidates with the broadest appeal, is the elimination of the spoiler effect since voters don’t risk anything by voting for a minor-party candidate. In addition, candidates are more likely to express their support for each other, building political coalitions, since being ranked second on a ballot is still a valuable outcome for a candidate.
    • Several issues have been raised about RCV. One worry is that the method confuses some voters and may be too complicated for some election administrators. Another worry is that those voters who gave first ranking to one of the least popular candidates without ranking the others will not see their votes counted if there are subsequent rounds. This would happen because they did not offer any lower-ranked choices to be counted if their candidate was eliminated in the instant run-off rounds. Their ballots are said to have become “exhausted,” similar to the “wasted” votes seen in plurality elections. Mathematically, however, the share of exhausted votes in a ranked-choice election will always be lower than the share of wasted votes in a plurality election – so long as at least a few voters rank most or all of the candidates.

RCV is not widespread in the U.S., but it is growing. Ballotpedia maintains a map showing current usage here. Notes: Another name for RCV is “instant run-off voting.” Another form of ranked-choice voting, where multiple candidates run for multiple seats, is called “single transferable vote.”

  • Approval voting: If the goal is to select the most tolerable compromise option instead of the most preferred, then a system called approval voting could be used. It asks voters to choose all acceptable options instead of just their single most preferred. The choice with the most votes (a plurality) wins. One clear advantage is that it is simple to understand and implement. It also encourages competition through more parties or candidates. And, because voters are not forced to choose just one option, the spoiler effect largely disappears. Finally, it tends to support second-choice centrist outcomes when enough voters vote for more than one option. On the downside, some voters may find it difficult to decide when they like 2nd, 3rd, or even 4th choices enough to vote for them. Alternatively, they may fear adding votes for 2nd or 3rd choices will dilute their vote for their favorite.
  • Proportional representation: Many European countries take a different approach, awarding seats to parties in proportion to their share of the vote across large, multi-member districts. Countries with three or more parties often use a system of proportional representation in which a voting district can be represented by more than one person or party, depending on their share of the total votes. In these countries, government control is most often determined by a coalition of parties who have to agree on which party will control a particular ministry position.
    • One of the advantages of this system is that it can improve representation and reduce “wasted votes.” Minorities are often better represented in such systems.
    • Proportional systems can be problematic, however, when party coalitions end up in gridlock or simply fall apart.
    • Unlike plurality or majoritarian systems, voters in most proportional systems cannot vote for specific candidates. Instead, they vote for a party, and the winning parties then choose from a closed list of their people who will fill the available open seats.
    • On one hand, this puts a premium on parties putting together and promoting winning policy platforms.
    • On the other hand, it dilutes the accountability of individual politicians.

Several European countries use an open list system where voters can indicate candidate preferences in addition to voting for their favorite party. This feature can improve the quality of representation, but it sometimes sparks fighting between candidates within parties.

Question: Which voting method do you prefer and why?

Today’s key takeaway is that elections can take many forms depending on circumstances and needs. In Part 3, we will take a look at how elections are administered.

Elections Administration

Welcome to Part 3! Thus far, we have reviewed (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity and (2) how elections can take many forms. We now cover who oversees our elections and how their policies can encourage trust or distrust in the system.

Elections provide a more peaceful and legitimate way of transferring power than other political systems, provided that everyone trusts that they are delivering a fair and legitimate result.

Elections administrators play a central role in this regard. So do state legislators, because the laws they pass dictate what local administrators may and may not do, for better or worse. Together, they can build trust by ensuring elections are inclusive, fairly and transparently conducted, and accurately counted. Trust is harmed when some citizens are excluded, bribed, intimidated, when their votes are not counted, or the counting process is done in secret.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the administration of elections is primarily controlled by each state government, with Congress reserving the right to review or intervene, such as in cases where voters’ civil rights may be threatened. Article 1, Section 4 says, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.” To learn more about how this Constitutional requirement affected the role of the states, click here and here. The National Conference on State Legislatures provides a good review of state and local elections administration here.

What is the quality of our elections?

The good news is that, on average, the quality of U.S. elections administration from 2012 through 2022 was better than 114 out of 169 countries measured. (According to the Electoral Integrity Project.) And the vast majority of our election administrators continue to strive to improve the process for voters and instill trust.

Who is responsible for running our elections?

The constitutions and laws of each state assign elections administration to various people and institutions. There is enormous variation across the U.S. in this regard.

The Chief Election Officer in each state varies according to state law. In 38 states, this title applies to the Secretary of State. As of 2023, thirty-one of these secretaries are elected; the other seven are appointed by a partisan body (the governor or state legislature). In 10 states, the Chief Election Officer is appointed by, to, or in service of a board of elections/election commission. In nine states, a board serves in tandem with a secretary of state. In Alaska and Utah, an elected Lieutenant Governor serves as Chief Election Officer.

All states also have local election authorities with titles that include county clerk, county auditor, clerk of the court, election board, director of elections, and supervisor of elections. In most states, the job goes to elected officials, with additional elected offices at the county and municipal levels actually conducting the elections. In many states, these local officials are elected, often in partisan elections. In other states, professional election directors are appointed by local governments.

At the level of the individual polling station, elections are run on election day, typically by part-time workers. In many states, these workers come in pairs representing the Republican and Democratic parties. These operations are supervised by the local election authority.

Altogether, over 70% of the officials who conduct elections in the U.S. are elected to office. To learn more, click here and here.

By contrast, most other democracies have a separate, nationally organized set of election workers equivalent to our postal service.” Studies show that people tend to accept the legitimacy of elections more and engage in election violence less — when they live in countries where electoral administrations have independence from partisan pressures and strong administrative capacity.

It is important to note that although partisan officials may not conduct their duties objectively, being vulnerable to partisan influences is not the same as being vulnerable to corrupt influences, although the two are often conflated in popular discourse.

The main protection you have against partisan behavior by a Secretary of State or a local election official is your willingness to pay attention to these roles and vote for candidates who are competent, transparent, do not endorse candidates or issues on the ballot, are non-partisan in their approach to elections, and thus instill trust in the election process.

So, the two big takeaways points for the day are these: (1) state and local officials, many of them partisan, control much of the way our elections are run; and (2) much depends upon the citizen’s commitment to vote for trustworthy, non-partisan, and competent election administrators – and the willingness and ability of those election administrators and political leaders to ensure that elections are run in ways that are free, fair, transparent, and accurate. That is how they can encourage trust.

In the next three days, we will review some important methods that have increased trust over the last 230 years of elections in the U.S. These include the universal right to vote, the secret ballot, and methods to protect election integrity.

Universal Voting Rights

Thus far, we have covered (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity, (2) why elections can take many forms, and (3) how choices made by our state legislatures and local elections administrators can encourage trust or create distrust. This week, we begin covering some ways that our country has found to increase citizens’ trust in our elections. 

One of those is universal voting rights for all non-felon citizens of age. The issue comes in two parts: who can lawfully vote, and how easy is it for them to do so?

Why have voting rights become universal in the U.S.?

Why are universal voting rights important to establishing trustworthy elections? Why not restrict them to one group – e.g., wealthy, educated men of property, as was the practice when our Constitution was first established?

Resentment and the risk of rebellion are the main reasons voting rights have become universal. People used to the idea of government “by the people, for the people” cannot help but deeply resent being excluded from participation in government. It is the height of irony to extoll a system of government that transfers power from the powerful few to the people – while excluding people without property, women, the formerly enslaved and their descendants, and the indigenous population. All of these exclusions have been outlawed. Some exclusions ended quickly, such as property rights. Other exclusions were eliminated only with great struggle – particularly with regard to ending Jim Crow laws and enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, which says, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

How has voting been made difficult in practice?

The legal right to vote is made meaningless if voting is intentionally made difficult in practice. The issue has three main dimensions: bureaucracy, distance, and time.

Bureaucracy: Few people will tolerate expensive, time-consuming, or complicated voting procedures. Voter registration establishes the eligibility of individuals to vote. Some countries automatically register their citizens, some require citizens to register themselves, and some, like the U.S., treat it as optional. Registration is one of the electoral process’s more costly, time-consuming, and complex aspects. It often accounts for a considerable portion of an election management authority’s budget, staff time, and resources. If conducted well, voter registration confers legitimacy to the process. Legitimacy is reduced if it is made too complicated or expensive or if people disagree on who should be included. Poll taxes, banned under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964), added to the expense of voter registration. The 1965 Voting Rights Act banned literacy tests and other barriers to registration.

Distance: Ideally, no voter should have to travel far to register or cast a vote.

  • By mail: Voting by mail, from home, eliminates the problem of distance for nearly everyone. As of 2022, eight states allow all voters to vote by mail: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Two states, Nebraska and North Dakota, allow counties to opt into conducting elections by mail. Nine states allow specific small elections to be conducted by mail: Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Four states have all-mail elections for certain small jurisdictions: Idaho, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New Mexico.

Should a voter be required to pay for postage to return their ballot? Most states allow for ballot drop boxes that do not require postage. Some people argue that requiring a voter to pay the postage is similar to a poll tax. Others argue that a stamp is probably cheaper than the gas used to drive to a polling place.

  • In-person: In those states that still vote mainly at polling places, there are often minimum standards for the number of voters per voting precinct and the location of drop-boxes and “vote anywhere” voting centers.
Voting Center Pros and Cons. The introduction of voting centers is one of the reasons why the number of polling places is falling in some states. Voting centers are an alternative to traditional, neighborhood-based precincts.

The main advantage to voters is that they can cast their ballots on Election date at any vote center in the jurisdiction (but not in the state) regardless of their home address. The advantage to the elections administration is cost savings: one voting center typically replaces many polling places. The downside to voters is that there are fewer places to vote, meaning some people will have to travel further than before, and face larger crowds and longer wait-times. The disadvantages to elections administrations come mainly from the challenges of verifying voter eligibility at any location, sharing voter participation with all locations so no one can vote twice, and being able to producing custom-made ballots on-the-spot: voter A will need a ballot with school board candidates that differ from those needed by voter B.

As of 2022, eighteen states allow jurisdictions to use vote centers on Election Day: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa (for some elections), Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.

Learn more here: https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/vote-centers

Voters may wish to be wary: data from the Election Assistance Commission shows the number of polling places has been dropping in almost every state for many years. This trend risks turning off some voters due to increased travel times, crowding, and longer wait times.

Practical questions about in-person voting quickly arise. For example, what about people with disabilities who cannot travel to a polling place or voting center or who cannot use a voting machine? Many states have laws requiring accommodations for disabled people, including those who cannot travel to a voting booth. In addition, the federal Help American Vote Act (2002) requires that each polling place have a device allowing a disabled person to cast their ballot privately and independently.

  • Election officials and policy-makers also have to make determinations on how to handle voters without specific residences, such as homeless or indigenous peoples living on reservations or voters who live overseas. This is true regardless of whether voting is by mail or in-person.

Time: A Bipartisan Policy Center study showed that in 2018, the vast majority of voters waited fewer than 30 minutes to vote although outcomes varied substantially by state and by voting precincts. Long wait times occurred most often in precincts with high minority populations, high population density, and low incomes. This may be partly due to the nature of state regulations: in most states, the voting hours and early voting provisions are mandated by state law, and cannot vary among local jurisdictions. Where allowed, some jurisdictions allow their polling places to stay open longer than other jurisdictions. Others allow early voting. Other options include scheduling elections on holidays or making election day a holiday. Time and distance can interact, too. Increasing the number of polling places so people don’t have to travel far can also reduce the time voters wait to cast their ballots. Increasing the number of polling stations within a voting location can also reduce waiting times. All of these methods use the administrative power of the state to enhance the quality of the state’s elections. Local election authorities often take the lead in implementing many of these solutions.

Racialized voter suppression: Historically, bureaucracy, distance, and time have all been used in more than a few states to make voting harder for people of color. The situation improved with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964) banning poll tax barriers to voting and the 1965 Voting Rights Act banning literacy tests and other barriers.

At issue is whether racialized discrimination in voting still exists and requires federal oversight. Supreme Court decisions have modified some aspects of the Voting Rights Act. The most recent were Shelby County v. Holder in 2013 and Louisiana v. Callais in 2026.

The evidence is clear that voter turnout rates for any single election are typically worst in locations where procedures are complicated, where people must travel long distances to polling places, and where wait times are also long – places where intentional or unintentional voter discrimination is more likely.

Yet, in some years, many voters considered some elections so important that they were willing to put up with some hassles. The 2020 election, for example, saw a much higher turnout rate than the 2016 election, even in states that reduced the number of polling places or did not allow vote-by-mail or early voting. (All states saw increased turnout rates that year.)

The main takeaway from today is that trust in elections can be increased through a universal right to vote. Tomorrow, the secret ballot!

The Secret Ballot

Thus far, we have covered (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity, (2) why elections can take many forms, and (3) how choices made by our state legislatures and local election administrators can encourage trust or distrust. In Part 4, we begin covering some ways that our country has found to increase trust in our elections. One of those is universal voting rights. The secret ballot is another.

The “secret ballot” is so universal these days that it is assumed to be a defining feature of democracy. In fact, there are still some examples of voting in the open for all to see. The “caucus” system used by some political parties in some American states to elect presidential delegates is a notable example. In caucus systems, participants divide themselves into groups according to the candidate they support. At the end, the number of voters in each group, visible to all, determines how many delegates each candidate has won. Such exceptions are the overwhelming minority, however. (The use of the caucus system has been falling over time. As of 2024, only five states use it: Nevada, North Dakota, Iowa, Utah, and Wyoming.)

Why is the secret ballot important to trustworthy elections?

The main idea is that having one’s vote kept secret prevents coercion and vote-buying. Being able to trace a specific vote to a specific voter opens the possibility that partisan actors will manipulate an election. They can pay for votes, or if that doesn’t work, they can threaten violence against those who vote against their preferred candidate. This is a clear risk for those voters in Gambia who openly toss marbles into cans.

Secret ballots – also known as “Australian Ballots” because they were first used in Australia in 1856 – were introduced as a reform meant to protect voters from being bought or harassed for “wrong” votes. It has become near-universal because it has been remarkably successful in this regard.

Secret ballots became common in the United States as a reform against voter coercion between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries. Before that time, many powerful groups – including labor unions and party bosses – often supplied pre-printed ballots with the expectation that their members would submit those as their vote. Failing to do so could result in losing status or privileges within the group. Bribery, firing threats by employers, and physical intimidation were also common tactics before the introduction of secret ballots.

Introducing “Australian Ballots” that were a) publicly paid for, b) cast in secret, and c) untraceable to the individual voter made it impossible for groups in power to check if individual voters cast their ballots in the desired way. Without the capacity to punish voters who didn’t vote for the chosen candidate, the power of these “political machines” to coerce people was reduced.

Question: Do you think ballot-selfies are a risk? State governments are divided. Click here to learn more.

The takeaway from today is that secret ballots increase trust in elections by reducing opportunities for political corruption and manipulation through election violence and bribery.

Election Integrity Fears

Vote counting machines.

So far, we have covered (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity, (2) why elections can take many forms, and (3) how choices made by our state legislatures and local election administrators can encourage trust or distrust. We also covered some ways that our country has found to increase citizens’ trust in our elections. One of those is universal voting rights. The secret ballot is another. In Part 6, we review how transparency, redundancy, and safeguards help strengthen election integrity.

How is election integrity defined?

The definition of “election integrity” has several parts. It generally refers to a situation where:

  • all citizens of age who wish to vote may do so without undue effort;  
  • all votes are be accurately counted;
  • agents from each participating political party (and independent candidates) can observe all election processes;
  • the final tabulation is agreed by all participating political parties and independent candidates;
  • the final tabulation is publicly and accurately reported; and
  • recounts and recourse to the courts are possible in response to legitimate challenges.

How is election integrity protected in the U.S.?

Concern about election integrity is always justified: it is as much a part of the foundation of our Republic as universal voting rights and the secret ballot. Election integrity is important to the legitimacy of election results – candidates and their supporters may not accept the results without it.

In the U.S., some of the loudest outcries concerning the 2020 elections came from people worried that expanding ballot access during the COVID pandemic was either a ruse for committing voter fraud or at least an opportunity for fraud.

How does our system protect against such worries? Below, we review the three main forms of voting: secret ballots, absentee ballots, and voting by mail.

Secret ballots: Let’s consider the case of secret ballots first. How can ballots be publicly secured while cast in secret?

Under current best practice in the United States, physical ballots must be marked by the voters, then counted by a tabulator, and then kept under the protection of authorized, if not certified, elections officials. The tabulator should be tested and audited in public meetings.  In many states, tabulators must meet strict security and accuracy standards, such as those established by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

Votes should never be cast electronically without a paper trail – doing so invites the possibility of electronically hacking the results. Ballots may be recorded and counted electronically, but a paper record must always be left behind.

These procedures make possible two key protections.

  • First, the risk of ballot stuffing and ballot destruction is reduced if all parties understand that every state requires a reconciliation of the ballots and votes cast before they certify the count. The number of paper receipts at a specific precinct can be counted against the number of registered voters who showed up to that precinct without having to sacrifice any voter’s secret ballot. The election authority will conduct an audit if there are any discrepancies (and not just in close races).
  • Second, these procedures ensure that, in the event of an election contest or recount, there are hard copies of the votes that cannot have been hacked.

Absentee ballots, voting by mail, and ballot-collecting:

Absentee ballots: When citizens claim they cannot use their official polling station on election day, they may be entitled to request an absentee ballot. In some states (27 as of 2022), however, no excuse is needed. People granted absentee ballots might be able to vote early at a different location, such as their county clerk’s office, or, more commonly, send their vote through the mail or via an authorized ballot drop box. All states allow some form of absentee voting.

Voting by mail: It works like absentee voting, except that ballots are automatically sent to each registered citizen rather than only upon request. As of 2022, eight states conduct elections primarily by mail, most commonly in western states with large rural areas, such as Oregon, which pioneered the practice in 2000.

Ballot collecting: This practice, also characterized by some as “ballot harvesting,” is the gathering and submitting of completed absentee or vote-by-mail ballots by third-party individuals, volunteers, or workers — rather than submission by voters themselves directly to ballot collection sites. Many, but not all, states allow it. Supporters promote ballot collecting as a help to those who cannot easily reach a mailbox with regular service.

Some election integrity groups were concerned that the increased use of absentee ballots, voting-by-mail, and ballot collecting during the pandemic would lead to an increased risk of voter fraud. Some of the worries were:

  • people could vote more than once in the same district using duplicate ballots
  • people could vote in more than one district or state
  • partisans could pose as legitimate voters and then fraudulently vote
  • pressure could be put on vulnerable people to mark their ballot “correctly” in front of other people
  • it could lead to vote-buying since ballots can be marked in front of the person paying the money
  • some ballot collectors might deliberately lose ballots suspected of supporting the “wrong” party or candidate
  • ballots could get lost or delayed by the U.S. Postal System.

There are several layers of defense against such fears, and they are effective. As we will document tomorrow, election fraud does sometimes occur, but it is incredibly rare and is too small in scale to affect most races at the national and state levels – though it has been harmful in some local races.

The first and main line of defense is each state’s voter database system. Such databases allow the state to cross-check absentee ballot applications and ballot submissions against the register. The result is that only one ballot is tallied per voter, and each voter can vote in their district only once.

This defense is possible only so long as the voter database registry is accurate. Similarly, up-to-date registries prevent voting in more than one district or state. This is why voters need to send in an updated application to vote if their address changes – and why jurisdictions and states need to update each other on the movements of their residents. As of 2023, various states are coordinating with each other in this regard, but a comprehensive system has yet to be agreed and implemented.

In addition, as of 2020, 32 states and the District of Columbia required ballot return envelopes to be signed and matched against voter signatures on file. This makes it difficult for operatives to fraudulently request ballots in other people’s names, just as it makes it possible to screen out fraudulent ballot submissions.

Most states have protections against coercion and bribery by ballot collectors. Some states are restrictive about who may collect ballots, often limiting the practice only to family members or designated caretakers. Some states limit how many ballots any person may collect on behalf of others. Many states require the voter to identify in writing his or her designated agent for the return of the ballot or require the individual who delivers the ballot to sign the outer return envelope.

Protections against lost ballot applications and ballot submissions exist as well. Ballot envelopes generally include an individualized serial number or bar code to ensure only one vote per individual voter. These codes allow election officials to keep track of ballot processing and help voters know whether their ballot has been received and counted. In most states, if a voter contacts an election official to report that a requested mail ballot has not been received, it can be tracked through an individualized bar code that allows officials to identify and cancel (or “spoil”) a stolen or lost ballot and send a new one. Bar codes also allow states to identify and eliminate duplicate ballots if more than one ballot has been cast in a voter’s name, whether mistakenly or corruptly. Drop-boxes can be located in secure, monitored areas. Lost ballots can be detected by comparing the number of ballot submissions received against the number of approved ballot distributions. An audit can be triggered if the gap is too large relative to the preliminary margin of victory.

Last but not least, anyone who commits voter fraud of any kind using a mail ballot risks severe criminal and civil penalties: up to five years in prison and $10,000 in fines for each act of fraud under federal law, in addition to any state penalties, that often include losing the right to vote in future elections.

Today’s main takeaway is that the expansion in voting methods, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been well-matched by procedures that make voter fraud very difficult. Tomorrow, we review the actual volume of voter fraud in the U.S.

Election Fraud Realities

In the last six days, we have covered (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity, (2) why elections can take many forms, and (3) how choices made by our state legislatures and local elections administrators can encourage trust or distrust. We also covered some ways that our country has found to increase citizens’ trust in our elections. These include universal voting rights, the secret ballot, and careful ballot certification procedures. Today, we look at the actual amount of electoral fraud seen in recent years.

How common has voter fraud been in the U.S.?

Facts show that 21st-century voter fraud exists in the United States but is incredibly rare. By way of example, the Heritage Foundation, a long-established conservative-leaning institution, has created an impressive database of instances of proven electoral fraud going back to 1979. As of March 2022, they found 1,349 cases, for an average of 30 instances per year. In 2022, however, the database records show 67 instances of fraud, most of which were undertaken during the 2020 elections. Of those, many were simply ineligible voters, but there were also more than a few cases of attempted duplicate voting and the fraudulent use of absentee ballots. Some of those involved ten or more ballots. Thus, those 67 instances could potentially represent several hundred fraudulent votes.

These numbers need to be put in the proper perspective. On one hand, many people believed the 2020 presidential election was “stolen.” However, it would not have made any difference to the 2020 presidential race even if all of those fraudulent votes had been cast in the state of Georgia or Arizona, both of which had the closest presidential margins of victory (about 11,000 votes each).

On the other hand, most of the electoral fraud that does occur is not at the presidential level. Rather, it is found mainly in local elections, where patronage jobs are at stake. And at that level, vote fraud can indeed make a difference. For example, in 2015, a city council election in the New Jersey town of Perth Amboy was decided by only ten votes. After it was discovered that at least 13 illegal absentee ballots had been cast, a judge overturned the election and ordered a new one.

The rarity of voter fraud on a scale large enough to affect state or federal elections makes sense based on sheer math: fraudulently casting one ballot is virtually guaranteed not to be enough to sway an election. In any event, the crime of trying to do so risks monetary fines or time in prison. For example, back in 1998, Connecticut would levy fines from $300 to $5,000 or one to five years in prison, depending upon the offense. More recently, Broward County in Florida announced similar penalties. It’s not a worthwhile risk for most people to take. Local elections can be an exception if very few votes are cast and the margin of victory is close; in such cases, a single fraudulent vote might make a difference. Even then, the legal penalty remains high.

What protects against fraudulent vote counting? 

What about altering the vote count? How does our system protect against that?

More than 230 years of elections in the U.S., plus lessons learned from other countries, have produced a robust set of procedures that are implemented with only minor variations from state to state and even internationally.

  • Basic safeguards against ballot stuffing and ballot stealing include:
    • Comparing the total number of ballots created to the total received, as well as unused and spoiled ballots. An imbalance normally triggers a review and additional scrutiny.
    • Similarly, a comparison is made of the number of ballots received versus people who voted. If they don’t match, an audit will be launched.
    • Ballot return envelopes contain serial numbers unique to each voter and must contain a matching signature from the voter.
  • Protections against mistakes in counting and deliberate distortions of counts include:
    • Allowing representatives of all interested parties to observe (but not conduct) the count and to present valid challenges when they detect problems.
    • Virtually every state conducts pre-testing of their tabulation equipment prior to each election.  These tests are done in view of the public and help ensure the equipment is accurately scanning, tabulating, and summarizing the votes.
    • In most states, electronic vote counts are double-checked by hand counts and audits. Note, however, that many election administration experts believe and numerous studies have shown that counting by hand is less accurate than machine tabulation.

Citizens should be aware these protections take time. There is an audit and vote certification process in all elections that often takes up to several weeks after an election to complete. The results are unofficial until they are certified.

A final protection is available: paper vote records are securely stored. This makes it possible for candidates to challenge the results or seek a recount. Moreover, in federal elections, all election materials must be kept for 22 months before being destroyed.

Most states have laws setting out the criteria that must be met for challenges and recounts. For example, can candidates provide some evidence that could plausibly change the outcome – implying the margin of victory is small enough for a few votes to make a difference? State-level recounts have been exceptionally rare. FairVote examined 5,778 statewide elections between 2000 and 2019. They found only 31 completed statewide recounts (that’s one half of 1 percent). Of those recounts, three overturned the outcome of the race.

It’s important to accept that no system is ever going to be 100% accurate forever. Isolated incidents of improperly handled ballots aren’t evidence of systemic fraud. They are more likely the result of human error, with rules not being followed or poor management of procedures. Hiring better managers and skilled election administrators along with better-designed voting systems and poll-worker training can help keep these incidents to as low a total as possible.

It is also possible to go too far and make voting so onerous that some qualified citizens cannot register to vote, some registered citizens cannot vote, and some legally cast ballots are not counted. Such outcomes are the opposite of election integrity.

Fake fraud.

Election integrity depends on our confidence in the system. Perception of election integrity is shaped by factors that often have little to do with the actual mechanics of counting and voting. For example, pollsters have found that confidence varies strongly according to which side won. Some politicians exploit this fact. A popular tactic in elections, even in the United States, is to raise doubts about the vote count in advance and during the election. This is especially tempting when the results may be close. Even so, the tactic has been seen far more often in emerging democracies lacking basic rights than in the more mature democracies.

Today’s main takeaway is that the amount of fraud, whether fraudulent voters or fraudulent counts, has been too small to make any difference in the vast majority of our elections. This outcome is the result of well-constructed procedures for the entire election cycle, from voter registration through the final certification and publication of election results.

Defending Against Threats to Our Elections

Welcome back! In Parts 1 – 6, we have covered (1) how elections are essential to your freedom and prosperity, (2) why elections can take many forms, and (3) how choices made by our state legislatures and local elections administrators can encourage trust or distrust. We also covered some ways that our country has found to increase the trust citizens place in our elections. These include universal voting rights, the secret ballot, and careful ballot certification procedures. In Part 7, we learned the actual amount of electoral fraud seen in recent years has been vanishingly small.

In Parts 8 and 9, we shift gears to consider how to defend our electoral system and what our own role might be. We can take steps to shore up the integrity of our system proactively! Doing so serves two purposes: it protects the ballot and reassures people of the security of the system.

Let’s dig in!

As election integrity becomes a more politically popular issue, it’s important to remember that defending our electoral system isn’t something that has to be done only in reaction to threats. Sometimes complications arise through acts of nature, honest human failings, and some natural confusion on the part of many citizens who do not understand the process. We will consider each of these below.

What are the four big threats to our elections?

There are four big threats to our elections. One is disinformation. Another is violence. Another comes from candidates and supporters who find ways to bend or break the rules with the hope of winning. The fourth comes from candidates and supporters who are unwilling to accept any election they lose.

Disinformation: Any election can lose its legitimacy if enough people have doubts that it was not conducted in a free and fair manner. Such doubts can be created by spreading false news about various election-related scandals. This psychology has been used by political parties and candidates who cannot accept losing. The tactic is especially potent when voters are highly polarized and already suspicious of each other – or in combination with cyber campaigns meant to create such polarization. Disinformation has also been used by foreign powers who wish to weaken the political cohesion of various countries. There is strong evidence, for example, that Russia, Iran, and China have engaged in such operations in many Western democracies, including the United States.

Violence: Election violence is probably as old as elections. For example, from about 200 BC, Roman elections were marred by political violence. Gang leaders linked to politicians would intimidate voters, and they often turned Rome into a battleground. There were very few safeguards, and there was also a lot of vote-buying. There have been some dramatic incidents of election violence in the U.S. In the Bloody Monday riot of 1855, members of the “no-nothings” violently blocked Catholic immigrants from Ireland and Germany from voting. In 1920, at least 30 Black residents of Ocoee, Florida, were massacred for participating or attempting to participate in the general election. Election results can also bring violence. The 1874 Battle of Liberty Place, or Battle of Canal Street, in New Orleans was an attempted insurrection following the disputed governor’s race of 1872. Most recently, allegations of electoral fraud led several thousand people to breach the U.S. Capitol, some violently, on January 6, 2021.

Bending or breaking the rules: In cases where a party has enough power, they can pervert the electoral system for their own gain. This has been true throughout history. Parties in power can make it harder for the opposition to register to vote. They can do that by reducing the number of polling stations and putting them far away. They can make it easier to reject votes coming from voting districts dominated by their opposition. They can make it easier to reject votes submitted by methods believed to be dominated by their opposition – such as vote by mail. They can also try to manipulate the way votes are counted. Ballots from opposition districts might get “lost,” or ballot stuffing might overwhelm opposition votes. They could also lessen or ignore voter registration requirements in order to allow more people to vote that might agree with their party – although this policy risks allowing more who would disagree as well.

As noted in Parts 6 & 7, these sorts of problems have become very rare due to election reform laws, well-constructed procedures, and more scrutiny from all interested parties.

Yet, vote counting can still be a partisan affair. In the 2000 presidential election, partisans fought in the courts over whether to include or exclude poorly recorded votes (the so-called “hanging chads”). See one recounting of that legal battle from History.com here. In the 2020 election, partisans in some states fought over whether to count mail-in ballots, with the worry that one side might be advantaged by such ballots. The 2020 election included another vote-counting battle, this time associated with the Electoral College. Some partisans asserted that the Vice President’s role of presiding over the electoral count (set out in the Twelfth Amendment) was not ceremonial and that the Vice President had the power to invalidate millions of votes. There was no legal or historical backing to this, but because it would benefit one side’s preferred candidate, it received support from some legislators. The Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022 helps clarify how the process should work.

Most election interference is more subtle than directly altering ballots. Far more common are “soft” methods of interference. These can include things such as deliberately spreading misinformation – also referred to as “fake news.” American politicians have engaged in fake news from the earliest days of the Republic. Foreign governments have joined in from time to time, including the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. Another technique is deliberately timing events so as to affect an election. Because these events don’t attack elections themselves, defenses against them must also involve more than just election planning. The defense against these measures is part of greater civic culture. That participation in civics is why we are all here in the first place! This effort is a work in progress, something that all of us can continue to work on.

Not all malicious actors come from abroad, however. The recent rise of American anti-electoralism is a pernicious threat that requires a more powerful defensive effort from American voters.

Part of the genius of our political system is that losing should never be a disaster: losing candidates and parties can always run again, over and over, so long as everyone is willing to uphold the system. This is why it is so troubling when some candidates for governor, Senate, and House in the United States have started refusing to agree in advance that they will accept their own election results. They will uphold the system only if they win. Americans need to adapt to this new internal threat and develop new methods to address it.

Acts of nature and poor management.

Not all election problems are caused deliberately. Anything that disrupts the efforts of voters or election administrators constitutes election interference. One of the most common causes of election interference is simply bad weather. This reality emphasizes that not all interference is preventable, but planning can help mitigate it. Other logistical errors can be completely accidental, such as traffic jams, power outages, or surprisingly long lines.

The difficulty with these logistical difficulties is that they can be weaponized by the same bad actors that were discussed previously. Politicians can’t control the weather, but they can reduce the number of polling places in unfriendly precincts, so waiting in line is a more uncomfortable experience. Politicians can’t easily alter traffic, but they can reduce the hours of early voting so that being slightly late prevents a voter from casting a ballot. Likewise, those same politicians may not create the demand that makes a long voting line, but they can slash the budget for elections so the polling place has fewer staffers and equipment to process ballots, slowing down the process. In short, just because a problem is not directly caused by bad actors doesn’t mean it isn’t their fault; many problems can be foreseen and planned for as long as malicious actors do not deliberately ignore them.

The role of media and pollsters in setting expectations.

There are frequent examples of the media or pollsters setting up expectations that lead to frustrations.

Most people check their favorite media for election results. This has advantages; media sources often interpret raw information in ways that make it easy to digest. For example, a cable TV network may present election results with more clarity than a state’s website.

An issue arises, however, when voters believe that some media outlet “calling” the results for an election is the official call rather than the eventual certification of results by local and state election authorities. It is important to understand that certification often occurs weeks later after each ballot has been received and counted. For example, in certain circumstances, military and overseas ballots can still be legally received and counted after election day.

Some voters may wonder why voting is worthwhile when a race is “called” by the media before all the votes are counted. An early call by one or more media outlets can lead to charges of fraud or rigged elections if they call a race earlier or later than expected and do not emphasize that these are “unofficial” results.

In 2020, for example, many citizens were confused and outraged when one TV network called the results for the State of Arizona early in the night before those citizens felt confident enough ballots had been counted.

Note that the network was not engaging in fake news. It was merely making an educated guess about how the race would end based on the vote count so far, polling, and historical trends.

Pollsters can cause frustration as well. If polling prior to an election indicates that the election may be a landslide, some voters may not bother “wasting their time.” Likewise, if early results on the East Coast indicate a landslide, voters on the West Coast may be put off from staying in a long voting line.

What about campaign finance laws?

One final subject that has recently become polarized on partisan lines is campaign finance laws.

These laws matter because political campaigning costs money. Obviously, more money means more ability to get the word out and win. And that obviously matters most in tight races. (How and when money matters may be a bit more complicated. See this article from FiveThirtyEight.)

This simple logic creates a lot of anxiety among candidates and their parties that various campaign finance laws will give the edge to their opponents. Two issues seem to be especially hot: whether one party is unfairly able to raise and spend more than the other and whether campaign donors should be able to remain anonymous. (See Open Secret’s definition of “dark money.”) The fundamental political dispute is whether political donations are a private expense that individuals shouldn’t have to disclose or a public function of an election that requires transparency.

In recent memory, bipartisan compromises like the McCain-Feingold Act forged a basic framework of campaign finance in America. However, decisions by the Supreme Court since that legislation have eroded most of that framework. But while there might be some grey areas that remain unsettled, it is important to acknowledge that defending our electoral system requires vigilant oversight of campaign finance. Protecting it from hostile actors who might attempt to bias the rules in partisan ways is no less important than preventing ballot stuffing.

Globally, campaign finance rules in most countries tend to be more restrictive than in the United States. In some countries, private donors are completely forbidden; instead, candidates are given a set pot of public money that they are not allowed to exceed. A hybrid of this concept was tried for several decades for presidential elections in the United States – matching funds were set aside from public funds so long as candidates voluntarily spent below a certain limit – but the success of private funding has made it worthwhile for major candidates to decline the matching funds in every election since 2008.

In other countries, private donations are accepted but with firm disclosure requirements and spending limits. One major reason for this difference is that many other countries have much shorter election cycles than the United States. Whereas campaigning in the USA can last for years, many other developed democracies have campaign seasons that last mere weeks. In those cases, this creates another issue to be regulated: not just how much money can be donated and by whom, but when it was spent.

For reflection: Many people believe transparency makes political corruption more difficult. In reality, proving political corruption can be very challenging. To prove a bribe, after McDonnell v. United States (2016), prosecutors must show more than just general efforts to aid a favored contributor. A conviction requires proof that the official committed an act that goes to the core of their office, like voting on a bill or approving a new policy. Moreover, published information about who contributed how much to a winning candidate makes it easier for that candidate to know who to corruptly reward with political favors! Could it be that a better solution would be to emulate the secret ballot? Specifically, would it work better to require the registration of donors but make it impossible for candidates (winning and losing) to learn who contributed substantively to their campaigns?

The big takeaway today is that our electoral system will always require a vigilant defense against threats, deliberate and innocent alike. How it defends against those threats is the result of legal choices made by voters, their elected representatives, and the judiciary.

What Can You Do?

Welcome to the final part of this course on elections. We have covered a lot of ground. In Part 8, we reviewed some of the many threats facing our elections system. Vigilant defense is called for.

So, what does all of this mean for the average citizen? An ordinary citizen can’t tally votes or stop a plot to interfere with an election. What can you or I do to defend American democracy? Well, there are a few tools in our kit that have a big impact that every citizen should be using.

  • Ensure your own voter records are correct and current. This is the most fundamental thing you can do. It is as simple as visiting your local election administrator’s website or calling their office.
  • Learn how elections are run in your state and where you live – from the moment candidates declare to the counting of ballots and the certification of final results. That knowledge will help protect you from misinformation and bad actors.
    • Local election administrators will welcome your visits and questions. And remember, most of them run for office, so it is in their best interest to inform you of their procedures. Have a group you belong to invite your local election authority to speak to them, or better yet—set up a visit by your group to the election office.
  • Consider becoming a poll worker. They are the backbone of our election system and the people who make it work on election day. Volunteer and help make democracy work in your neighborhood!
  • Support increased levels of electoral funding to assist administrative officials with the work they do. Tell your legislators and tell the media you do not want electoral officials to be hamstrung by too little money in the budget to defend against threats and accidents.
  • Support increased oversight of electoral spending. Tell your legislators and tell the media you want evidence that funding is adequate and is not being wasted. Regardless of funding level, if there is insufficient oversight of this spending, then there is no guarantee of efficacy.
  • Support adequate planning for contingencies like the weather or even pandemics. Tell your local election administrators, your legislators, and the media where you see problems that need attention.
  • Support non-partisan election officials and responsible legislators. Effective and fair election integrity procedures require election officials and the courts to function in a non-partisan manner without being undermined by our political leaders.  Electing partisan warriors to oversee our elections will only bring us more distrust.
  • Join the election profession. You could assist the increasing efforts to support the training and recruitment of a strong new cadre of election officials to replace the large share coming toward retirement. These positions are increasingly important to our democracy, and offer rewarding opportunities.

Regular Americans like you can undertake these initiatives at both the state and local levels. The effects of such efforts are observable each election day when some states run elections more smoothly than others. It is not publicly understood that good results are derived from the preparation done in years prior. This issue is neither red nor blue, with states on both sides executing elections well.

  • Lastly, tick a box on your taxes. If you do not like dark money in presidential campaigns, with its whiff of corruption, the easiest thing that any taxpayer can do is to tick a box on their taxes. That’s it! The box asks taxpayers if they want to designate on their federal income tax return to have $3 go to the public funding of qualified campaign expenses. It doesn’t raise your taxes by $3; it just designates $3 of the total to this fund. (To learn more, click here.) This is the same public funding match that was mentioned above. In the last decade, American presidential candidates have resorted to accepting private donations and rejecting public funds since the size of the matching funds was less than half of what they could raise privately. The result is that it is harder to meaningfully govern campaign finance. You can change that. The more people that check the box, the larger the fund is. Unfortunately, very few Americans tick this box. According to the Federal Election Commission, only 4% of Americans did so as recently as 2018, down from 21% in 1988. This decline is likely due to an erroneous belief that the $3 adds a cost rather than reapportioning existing dollars. Regardless, it is by far the easiest thing any taxpayer can do to help increase accountability and transparency in American elections.

Your final takeaway from this course is that there are many ways that Americans just like you can and should play an active role in the defense of our elections.

Thank you all for reading! And don’t forget to vote in every election!

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